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Abstract—Satellite Communications can be used when
other communication systems are either destroyed or over-
loaded. Observation satellites and Delay/Disruption Toler-
ant Networks are technologies that can be interconnected
to provide emergency communication for disaster recovery
operations. DTNs use a store-carry-forward mechanism
to forward messages through intermediary nodes to the
destination node. The reliability of relaying messages
through multi-hop nodes poses a significant problem in
DTNs due to lack of consistent connectivity. These network
characteristics make DTNs to heavily rely on the cooper-
ation of neighbouring nodes for the successful delivery of
packets. However, the presence of malicious or selfish nodes
will have a great impact on the network performance. In
this paper, we design a decentralised trust management
scheme (DTMS) to filter out malicious nodes in DTNs.
First, the number of forwarding evidence are combined
with the energy consumption rate of the nodes to formulate
direct trust. Then, a recommendation trust is computed
from the indirect trust, recommendation credibility and
recommendation familiarity. Recommendation credibility
and familiarity improve the overall recommendation trust
by filtering out dishonest recommendations. A comparative
analysis of DTMS is performed against a Cooperative
Watchdog Scheme (CWS), Recommendation Based Trust
Model (RBTM) and Spray & Wait protocol. The results
show that DTMS can effectively deal with malicious
behaviours in DTNs including trust related attacks.
Index Terms—Delay Tolerant Networks, trust manage-
ment, routing misbehaviour, emergency.
Delay/Disruption Tolerant Networks (DTNs) are net-
work architectures developed to cope with intermittent
connectivity and long delays in wireless networks. Un-
like traditional networks where packets are forwarded
along fixed links, DTNs use a store-and-forward ap-
proach to overcome the lack of end-to-end paths [1],
[2]. DTNs comprise of nodes with limited resources
such as buffer space and power. These constraints in
resources, in addition to the sparsity and mobility of
these nodes often result in intermittent connectivities.
The application of DTN spans across a wide range of do-
mains including Under-Water Networks (UWNs), Pocket
Switched Networks (PSNs), Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks,
Military applications and Disaster recovery and rescue
operations [3], [4]. Recently, there is a growing interest
in DTN routing [5]. However, not much attention has
been paid to routing misbehaviour. In DTNs, a node can
misbehave by dropping packets relayed to it, this can
be done intentionally even when the node has sufficient
buffer space and contact opportunities. These selfish or
malicious behaviours can lead to routing misbehaviours.
Although routing misbehaviour has been well studied in
MANETs and WSNs, the unique network characteristics
of DTNs such as lack of an end-to-end path between
nodes, difficulty to predict mobility patterns and long
variable delays have made these schemes unsuitable for
DTNs [6].
Recent studies on routing misbehaviours in DTNs
show that malicious nodes reduce the message delivery
probability; nonetheless, a few misbehaviour detection
schemes in DTNs [6], [7], [8] have been proposed
based on forwarding evidence which are costly in terms
of transmission overhead and verification of feedback.
These existing approaches proposed in literature do not
effectively filter out dishonest recommendations. For ex-
ample, [9] relies on confidence factor to compute indirect
trust. This approach produces a high recommended trust
value for indirect trust computation and can result in
colluding attacks. Again, evaluating the trustworthiness
of a node based on its forwarding behaviour alone may
result in an inaccurate trust computation of a node’s
trust value. Misbehaviour detection schemes such as
PMDS [6] will translate to more energy consumption and
computational cost which already is a major challenge
in DTNs. Popular approaches such as Encounter-Based
Routing (EBR) consider encounter value as a metric
which is based on pairwise contact probability. EBR
is no robust against collaborative attacks. The authors
in [10], [11] propose trust management schemes that
address selfish behaviours and collaborative attacks in
DTNs. However, the proposed solutions do not address
routing misbehaviour explicitly. Some of the factors
such as connectivity considered in evaluating the trust
worthiness of a node are not suitable for DTNs. Other
solutions such as COCOWA [12] and CWS [13] focus on
the mitigation of selfish behaviour and do not consider
other routing misbehaviours.
In this paper, we propose a decentralised trust man-
agement scheme which incorporates event familiarity to
formulate trust relationship. The trustworthiness of each
node is evaluated based on direct and recommended
trust relationship formed between nodes. The direct trust
is computed based on the forwarding behaviour and
the energy consumption rate of the evaluated node. To
improve trust computation, we incorporate recommen-
dation trust which is formulated by the combination
of recommendation credibility and event familiarity. To
validate our DTMS, we implement extensive simulations
in ONE simulator to reflect mission critical scenarios
using the Post-Disaster Model (PDM) - RFC 7576
[14] which is a reference model for emergency support
and disaster recovery. We compare the performance of
DTMS scheme with existing benchmarks schemes when
DTN nodes are compromised. Simulation results show
that DTMS mitigates individual and colluding packet
dropping attackers without incurring high message cost
under best trust formation.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. We
review related work in Section II. In Section III, we
present the system model and attacks related to trust
management schemes. The proposed scheme is presented
in Section IV. In Section V, a performance evaluation
is carried out and the simulation results discussed. We
conclude this paper in Section VI.
I. RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss the existing trust and rep-
utation management schemes in Peer-to-Peer (P2P) and
WSNs, Mobile Ad-hoc, and trust management schemes
in DTNs.
A. Trust Management in P2P and WSNs
In the context of P2P networks, trust management
schemes are distributed; there is no central authority
to monitor and evaluate the trustworthiness of nodes
in the network. Every node monitors and evaluates the
trustworthiness of its neighbouring nodes. In structured
P2P networks, a decentralised trust management scheme
which uses a P2P recommender system based on a search
tree that is virtually distributed is proposed by [15]. Each
peer is assumed to be a trustworthy neighbour unless
a complaint is received by the virtually distributed tree
search. The authors in [16] propose EigenTrust, a secure
and distributed strategy to compute global trust values
based on iteration. This global trust is computed using
transitivity and stored in a Content Addressable Network
(CAN). Similar to the approach in [16], a decentralised
reputation based trust supporting framework (PeerTrust)
with an adaptive trust model for evaluating the trustwor-
thiness of peers based on a transactional feedback system
is proposed by [17]. Both EigenTrust and PeerTrust
use the trustworthiness of the recommender to evaluate
indirect trust. The authors in [18] propose a new fair
scheduling technique PowerTrust to leverage the power-
law feedback characteristics. This robust and scalable
P2P reputation system uses a distributed ranking mecha-
nism to dynamically select nodes that are most reputable
in a P2P network. In unstructured P2P, the trust queries
are generally flooded to the network. A detailed model
for trust computation is not defined in the model as
presented in [19]–[22]. Peers use collective feedback in
decision making to mitigate inauthentic file downlands.
There are several trust management schemes proposed
for WSNs. One of the first reputation-based frameworks
for WSNs (RFSN) was proposed by [23]. RFSN uses
two building blocks which include the watchdog and
the reputation blocks. The watchdog block is used for
monitoring the communication behaviour of the nodes
while the reputation block is used to evaluate the trust-
worthiness of sensor nodes using a Beta distribution
framework. In [24], a Parameterized and Localized trUst
Scheme (PLUS) is proposed, PLUS uses both direct and
recommended trust to build trust relationships among
sensor nodes. The integrity of a packet is checked
when a trusted node receives a packet from a node
that is suspected to be malicious. The trust value of
the suspected node is reduced when the integrity check
fails irrespective of whether the node was involved in
the malicious activity. Another strategy [25] has been
proposed for cluster-based WSN. This distributed trust-
based framework uses a mechanism to select trustworthy
cluster heads. In this approach, trust is modelled using
weighing mechanisms of some parameters including
packet drop rate, control packets and data packets. Each
node stores these weighing mechanism in a trust table
and sends feedback to the selected cluster heads. In
event-driven WSNs, authors in [26] propose a reputation
based protocol (TIBFIT) to diagnose and mask arbitrary
node failures. This protocol analyses the binary reports
from neighbours to determine the occurrence of an event.
An active detection-based security (ActiveTrust) and
trust scheme is proposed for WSNs by [27]. This trust-
based routing scheme uses the trust level of neighbouring
nodes and the trust requirements of a packet to select an
optimal forwarding path. ActiveTrust creates detection
routes to compute nodal trust thereby preventing black-
hole attacks and optimizing the lifetime of the network.
An integrated trust management framework (iTrust) is
proposed in [28] to evaluate the trustworthiness of nodes
in the neighbourhood using monitor nodes. These special
nodes gather information about neighbouring nodes and
share their trust indices with encountered nodes which
is used to make forwarding decisions.
B. Trust Management in Ad-Hoc Networks
In ad-hoc networks, several schemes have been pro-
posed and discussed in a comprehensive survey by [29].
A recommendation based trust model with a defence
scheme is proposed to filter trust propagation attacks
using clustering techniques [9]. This scheme pays atten-
tion to attacks that are related to dishonest recommended
from neighbouring nodes at a particular time frame based
on the number of encounters. To measure and model trust
evolution, an information theoretic framework is pro-
posed in [30] using entropy and probability to acquire,
maintain and update trust behaviours that are associated
with the behaviour of nodes. In the proposed framework,
propositions are developed to establish trust through third
parties that assist in route selection and malicious node
detection. In [31] authors extend the notion of traditional
trust to a data-centric framework for the establishment
of trust based on several evidence techniques. They pay
attention to networked systems that are highly volatile
and resource constrained and use the theory of Dempster-
Shafer to evaluate data reports and compare their results
to weighted and Bayesian schemes. In [32], a fully
distributed public key certificate management based on
trust graph and a cryptographic threshold is proposed.
In this model, users can issue public key certificates and
also perform authentication using the certificates. The
threshold cryptography is used to check misbehaving
nodes that issue false public key certificates.
C. Trust Management in DTNs
To maximise delivery ratio and reduce the trans-
mission cost of messages, an Encounter-Based Routing
(EBR) [33] has been proposed to evaluate the trust-
worthiness of a node when it encounters another node.
This routing strategy uses an encounter value (EV)
which is a reputation metric obtained from a current
window counter forwarding evidence. EBR has been
widely adopted for DTN routing as most research works
in DTNs leverage on its routing strategy. In [10], a novel
methodology is proposed to deal with malicious and self-
ish behaviours. This trust management protocol which
incorporates QoS is based on Stochastic Petri Net (SPN)
and is designed to optimise the routing performance
in DTNs. Extensive simulation analysis has shown that
the proposed scheme outperforms Bayesian trust routing
schemes, Epidemic and PROPHET routing protocols
with a lower message overhead. Similarly, authors in [11]
propose a Provenance-based trust model (PROVEST) for
accurate peer to peer assessments. In this model, a data-
driven strategy is used to reduce the consumption of
constrained resources. The authors in [34] propose a
graph-based iterative algorithm as a robust trust mecha-
nism for node detection. In a comparative analysis using
extensive simulations, authors have illustrated that their
proposed scheme performs better than other trust man-
agement schemes such as the EigenTrust and Bayesian
framework [16] under Byzantine attacks. A Probabilistic
Misbehaviour Detection Scheme (PMDS) is proposed by
[6] based on data forwarding evidence. In this scheme,
the inspection game in [35] is adopted to demonstrate
the cost of misbehaviour detection. Simulation results
show that there is a reduction in the forwarding cost that
is incurred by iTrust and that iTrust effectively detects
routing misbehaviour by the malicious nodes in both sin-
gle and multi-copy routing protocols in DTN. To reduce
the detection time and improve precision, a Collaborative
Contact-based Watchdog (CoCoWa) which is based on
a local watchdog detection is proposed in [12]. When a
node encounters another node, a diffusion module is used
to transmit and process false positives and negatives.
Analytical and experimental results presented using the
proposed scheme show reduction in the detection time
and message transmission cost when nodes collaborate
using the diffusion module.
D. Summary and research challenges
DTNs are resource constrained networks with limita-
tions in computational, power and communication capa-
bilities which makes them unsuitable for the trust man-
agement schemes proposed for P2P, WSNs and Ad Hoc
networks. In P2P, the proposed schemes for structured
and unstructured overlays cannot be applied to DTNs
because the failure of peers will lead to the replication of
data across multiple peers thereby exhausting the limited
resources in a resource-constrained network. In WSNs,
benchmark schemes such as RFSN relies only on direct
trust to make forwarding decisions. If the subject node
has no previous encounter with the evaluated node, it
may assume the encountered node is malicious. In ad hoc
networks, trust degrades automatically as the number of
hop increases. This may not be true in DTNs as node
rely on a hop by hop forwarding approach. Filtering out
malicious nodes that propagate false recommendations
has not been effectively tackled in MANETs. These
nodes collude with each other and exaggerate trust rating
across the network. In DTNs, trust management schemes
proposed for routing misbehaviour mainly pay attention
to selfish misbehaviour. Game theoretic models such as
iTrust effectively detects misbehaving nodes but they are
very expensive as a result of the verification cost and the
overhead in transmission.
II. PRELIMINARY
In the proposed scheme, trust computation is based on
the history of encounters known as the Encounter Record
(ER). Suppose two nodes a and b come in contact with
each other, ER generated by node a about node b is
denoted by ERab = (ERab1 , ERab2 , .....ERabn) where
ERabi is a single interaction record with node b.
A. System Model
This paper considers a system model deployed in
emergency communication networks [4] as shown in
Fig 1. This Post-Disaster Mobility (PDM) model is
recommended for Information Centric Network (ICN)
baseline scenarios RFC 7476 [14] and similar to the
reference scenario described by ETSI [36] for emergency
communications. The PDM model imitates the situation
Fig. 1: A Satellite-DTN Emergency Communication
Network
after the occurrence of a natural disaster. This model
assumes that people live in a clustered neighbourhood
which is affected by disaster. The post-disaster rescue
operation begins after the disaster. Similar to the ETSI
Satellite Emergency reference scenario [36], relief cen-
tres are set up for the disaster relief and rescue operation.
A brief description of the relief centres are described
below:
a) Main Coordination Centre: This is the main
emergency centre for the coordination of the entire
recovery and rescue operation.
b) Relief Camps: Rescue workers are deployed
from this centre to the neighbourhood (incident area).
Relief materials are also collected from the coordination
centre to the relief camps.
c) Evacuation Centre: Each neighbourhood has an
evacuation centre, victims in affected areas are evacuated
to this centre.
d) Medical Centre and Hospitals: Medical person-
nel and paramedics are deployed from this centre to the
neighbourhood and evacuation centres
e) Police and Fire Station: Patrol teams and fire
trucks are periodically dispatched from this centre to
other recovery centres.
The mobility patterns of moving agents captured in
the PDM model includes centre-to-centre, convergence-
move, cyclic route and event-driven patterns. We pay
more attention to the event-driven mobility pattern which
is triggered when a specific event is notified to a desig-
nated centre as shown in Table 1. Event familiarity can
be exploited in the selection of next forwarding node to
increase the delivery probability of message to reach the
intended recipient.
B. Attack Model
This paper considers individual and colluding attack-
ers. We highlight attacks considered in this scenario
that can be performed by malicious nodes in a DTN
environment as follows:
a) Dropping Misbehaviour: Just like other par-
ticipating nodes in the network, malicious nodes re-
ceive messages but forward a small percentage of these
messages and drop the rest intentionally. Two types
of dropping misbehaviours in DTNs are blackhole and
greyhole attacks. A blackhole attacker drops all messages
relayed to it even if the buffer available is large enough
to store the messages. We consider 50% malicious nodes
as our worse case scenario.
b) Bad mouthing attacks: Providing bad recom-
mendations to tarnish the reputation of well-behaved
nodes may lead to a decrease in their chances of relaying
packets across the network. Such fraudulent behaviours
prevent nodes from relaying packets using the best routes
in the networks. Trusted nodes can conspire to propagate
these unfavourable rating against healthy nodes.
TABLE I: An Event Table
Event Description Event Responder Group 1 Responder Group 2
e1 Casualty Alert Relief camps Moving agents
e2 Security Alert Police & Fire station Ambulance & Fire
trucks
e3 Supplies Alert Supply vehicles Ambulance
e4 EWS Alert Evacuation Camp Rescue Workers
c) Ballot stuffing attacks: This attack is aimed at
misleading the trust management framework to mal-
function by providing bad nodes with good reputation
based on forwarding evidence. This attack increases the
chances of relaying packets through malicious nodes so
that they can drop or temper with packets relayed to
them.
III. PROPOSED TRUST MODEL
In this section, we present a Decentralised Trust Man-
agement Scheme (DTMS) for efficient data forwarding
in DTNs. This scheme considers the attacks presented
earlier in Section III. The overall trust is computed by di-
rect and recommended trust from the Encounter Record
ER generated between two nodes. A statistical model
similar to [9] is used to formulate trust relationships.
The computation of the trust relationship is based on
Beta distribution two class parameter (α, β) used to
estimate the probability of expectation. Beta distribution
can be computed from Encounter Record ER generated
when a node comes in contact with a neighbouring node.
The positive and negative interactions are represented
as (α, β) respectively. The Beta distribution can be
expressed as:
f(p|α, β) = Γ(α+ β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)
pα−1(1− p)β−1 (1)
where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, α ≥ 0, β ≥ 0. The two parameters
(α, β) can be calculated by accumulations of relayed and
dropped messages. In DTNs, delivery probability and the
number of dropped messages have been widely used as
performance metrics [37], [33], [6], [38]. These metrics
have been used in evaluating misbehaviour detection
and mitigation schemes proposed for routing, selfish and
malicious misbehaviours in DTNs.
A. Direct Encounter Trust
In the model proposed, a direct trust relationship is
formed from the ERab between two nodes a and b at
time t. This relationship is expressed as (αab, βab) where
αab and βab represent positive and negative observations
observed by node a about node b. Assuming node a has
no contact history with node b, an initial trust value of 0.5
is given to the opinion held by node a about node b. Let
s and f represent the positive and negative accumulated
evidence from the interactions between nodes a and b.
The two class parameter (αab, βab) is computed as
αab = s+ 1 and βab = f + 1 (2)
The direct trust relationship from an ERab is computed
as:
TDab =
αab
αab + βab
(3)
Due to mobility of nodes, the ER table generated
changes over time. An adaptive decay λ factor is intro-
duced to decrease the influence of previous observations
between nodes a and b before the aggregation of a new
trust value. If node a observes an additional event in its
ERab between time tn and tn+1. The new interactions
observed can be expressed as snew and fnew for positive
and negative behaviours. Before updating (αab, βab), s
and f are updated as:
s = sold × λ+ snew and f = fold × λ+ fnew (4)
where 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, sold and fold are the old positive
and negative interactions observed by node a about the
behaviour of node b. When there are no interactions
observed between two nodes, s and f are dynamically
updated based on the packet forwarding behaviour of the
node.
s = sold × λ and f = fold × λ (5)
To obtain the overall direct trust between two nodes a
and b, the direct trust TDab and the energy trust T
E are
computed as:
TDEab = T
D
abW
D
ab + T
E
abW
E
ab (6)
where WDab + W
E
ab = 1, W
D
ab ∈ [0, 1], WEab ∈ [0, 1] and
WDab and W
E
ab represent the weight values of direct trust
and energy trust respectively.
Energy Trust: Existing trust management schemes
proposed for DTNs do not consider energy trust in
formulating of trust relationships between nodes. In re-
source constrained networks, one of the major challenges
is energy consumption. Energy is an important metric in
DTNs in view of the fact that messages must be for-
warded to active intermediary nodes before it gets to the
destination node. In resource exhaustion attacks, mali-
cious nodes can flood messages to neighbouring nodes to
deplete the residual energy of encountered nodes. On the
contrary, nodes that exhibit selfish behaviours consume
less energy due to their non-forwarding behaviour. This
scheme considers energy as a QoS metric to ensure that
selfish or malicious nodes do not exhaust the limited
resources available in DTNs. The evaluation of the
forwarding behaviour of a node does not adequately
reflect the estimated trust value of a node. A node that
has run out of energy can be assumed to be a malicious
node. An energy prediction model is incorporated to the
direct trust computation to evaluate the reliability of a
node in forwarding messages.
The authors in [39] describe the energy model that
captures the energy consumption in DTNs. The energy
module computes the energy consumption by each node.
Several authors [39], [40], [41] have used similar energy
modules to compute energy consumption. We use the
energy profile described in [39] which has been widely
adopted for the analysis of energy consumption in mobile
devices. Table 2 presents the energy parameters used to
compute the energy consumption. In DTN, a node that
TABLE II: Summary of Notations Used
Parameters Settings
Scan Energy 0.92 mW/s
Transmit Energy 0.08 mW/s
Receive Energy 0.08 mW/s
Initial Energy 4800 Joules
has run out of energy can be assumed to be malicious
since it is not forwarding packet, an energy prediction
model is incorporated into DTMS for the evaluation of a
node’s trustworthiness. The Residual Energy ER which
is the average remaining energy is computed as EI −
EC where EI is the initial energy value and EC is the
consumed energy which is computed as EC = {Es +
Et +Er} where Es, Et, Er represent the scan, transmit
and receive energy respectively. We evaluate the energy
consumption of a node as EC ∈ [0, 1]. The energy trust
is computed as:
TE = 1− EC (7)
TE must be ≥ energy threshold. In the energy module, a
punishment factor is introduced which is applied to the
weight of TE if EtEr < 0.6. It is assumed that a node
exhibits a selfish or a non-forwarding behaviour based if
the ratio of Et and Er is less than 0.6.
B. Recommendation Trust
One of the characteristics of DTNs is sparse connec-
tivity. Due to lack of end-to-end connectivity, DTNs use
a store and carry forward message dissemination ap-
proach. A message can be relayed through intermediary
nodes till it gets to the destination node. In this situa-
tion, a node can get recommendation from neighbouring
nodes to evaluate the trustworthiness of an encountered
node. To build trust relationships that are reliable, rec-
ommendations from encountered neighbouring nodes are
incorporated into the trust computation.
Indirect Trust: Assuming nodes a and c have previous
contact histories ERac with each other and node a has
no ER with node b but node c has an ERcb with node
b. As shown in Fig. 2, node c’s direct observation about
the behaviour of node b can be used as an indirect trust.
The indirect trust of node a about the behaviour of node
b observed by node c is computed using (αcab, β
c
ab). The
indirect trust of node a about the behaviour of node b
observed by node c is computed as:
Rcab =
αcb
αcb + βcb
(8)
where αcb and βcb are positive and negative events gener-
ated from ERac observed from ERcb. Recommendations
from neighbouring nodes often lead to collaborative
attacks in trust management systems. To address this, we
incorporate recommendation credibility and familiarity
values for indirect trust computation.
Fig. 2: Direct and Indirect trust
Recommendation Credibility Trust: The main reason
for incorporating recommendation trust into the trust
management framework is to eliminate false recommen-
dations. A common set of neighbours are considered
for trust evaluation. Recommendation credibility is com-
puted from the common neighbours of the evaluating
and the evaluated node. As shown in Fig. 3, nodes
a and b have common neighbours c1, c2, ...., cn. These
recommendations are filtered and computed as the rec-
ommendations for node b as follows:
RCab = 1− (Tc2b − TRb(avg)) (9)
where Tc2b is the recommendation trust value of node
b observed from recommendation c2 and TRb(avg) is the
average trust value from all recommendations.
Fig. 3: Computation of recommended trust
Recommendation Familiarity: The concept of famil-
iarity was introduced by the authors in [42] for the
web-based product brokering recommendation agents.
They point out that trust, confidence and familiarity are
different modes of asserting expectation. We adopt the
approach similar to [43] to compute this recommendation
technique. In recommendation familiarity, the mobility
pattern of the responder nodes in the PDM model are
taken into consideration. The PDM model is an event-
driven model with frequent encounter graphs formed
between nodes with frequent inter-contact times from
events. Motivated by the concept of social trust in
opportunistic networks [44], event similarity is incor-
porated into the proposed scheme as a recommendation
metric to evaluate an encountered node’s trustworthiness.
This consideration is based on the post-disaster mobility
model (Model 1) adopted as a baseline scenario for
disaster relief and rescue operations RFC 7476 [14].
The reference scenario for deployment of emergency
communication by ETSI for large scale disaster (EQ
Scenario) also reflects similar mobility pattern and mo-
bile agents. A brief description of the PDM model
is provided in Section III B. Based on the mobility
pattern of the responders, we exploit event similarities to
enhance the selection of intermediary responders. We use
an event feature, Es = {e1, e2, e3, ....ei, ..., er} where
Es represents the vector of events with r elements as
described in Table 1. When an event is triggered, a
trust relationship is formulated based on the frequency of
similar events or actors. This relationship allows nodes
to give more preference to neighbouring nodes with
similar event features. The recommendation familiarity
is computed as:
RFab =
Esc2b
Esc2
× Φ
1
Esc2b (10)
where Esc2b is the number of events in the encounters
between nodes c2 and b based on Es, Esc2 is the total
number of events in the encounter record of node c2
and Φ is the regulatory factor which is used to scale the
impacts of the number of encounters, Φ ∈ [0, 1]. The
regulatory factor can be adjusted based on characteristics
and environment of the application. The trust value from
recommendations is computed based on TRab, R
F
c2b and
RCc2b. The recommended trust value for the evaluated
node b is computed as:
TRab =
∑n
i=1 0.5 + (Tc2b − 0.5)×RCab ×RFab
n
(11)
C. Overall Trust Value
To obtain the overall direct trust between two nodes
a and b, the direct trust TDEab and the recommendation
trust TRab are computed as:
Tab = T
DE
ab W
DE
ab + T
R
abW
R
ab (12)
where WDEab + W
R
ab = 1, W
DE
ab ∈ [0, 1], WRab ∈ [0, 1]
and WDEab and W
R
ab represent the weight values of direct
trust and total recommended trust respectively.
Updating Trust value: Due to the frequent disruptions
in DTNs, the computed trust value for each node should
be updated periodically. However, when the updates are
too frequent, this will result in a high energy consump-
tion. Keeping the trust record window for too long can
result in collaborative attacks. A Trust record window is
used to update the overall trust value periodically. The
trust record window is made up of several time slots
for updating trust. Node a evaluates the trustworthiness
of node b as Tab(i) = 1...., ts, where ts represents the
number of time slots. The trust value for the next trust
record window is updated as
Tab(i+ 1)new = Tab(i)wab(i) + Tab(i+1)wab(i+1) (13)
where i = 1, ...., ts,, wabi + wabi+1 = 1 and wabi
and wabi+1 represent the weight values for previous and
current trust respectively.
D. Forwarding Decision
The main purpose of the proposed scheme is to ensure
that messages are forwarded efficiently to the destination
nodes in the emergency communication network. As-
suming nodes a and b encounter each other and node a
has message for destination node d. Based on the overall
trust computation Tab, node a selects node b as its next-
hop node based on the following criteria:
1) Nodes a and b come in contact and form an
encounter record and event description record.
2) Nodes a and b compute direct trust relationship
from forwarding evidence and energy consump-
tion.
3) Nodes a and b compute recommendation trust
from indirect trust relationship, recommendation
credibility and recommendation familiarity.
4) Nodes a and b formulate a trust relationship based
on direct trust and recommendation trust.
5) Nodes a and b exchange their trust record and
update their trust tables based on the overall trust
value.
6) Node a decides whether to forward a packet
through node b based on the trust threshold.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The performance of DTMS is evaluated using Op-
portunistic Network Environment simulator [45]. ONE
simulator is designed specifically for communication
in opportunistic networks. We simulate the proposed
scheme on top of the PDM model. The PDM model was
developed by [4] and recommended by IETF [46] for
Information Centric Networks: Baseline Scenarios for
Emergency Support and Disaster Recovery operations.
The Map-Based mobility model constrains the movement
of nodes to the paths defined in the map data. The
movement models understand arbitrary map data defined
in (a subset of) Well-Known Text (WKT). Such data is
typically converted from real-world map data or created
manually using Geographic Information System (GIS)
programs such as OpenJUMP. We use five neighbour-
hoods, 4 main centres, 10 relief and evacuation camps,
100 rescue workers, 10 supply vehicles, 10 emergency
vehicles, 10 police patrols for the PDM simulation setup
which runs for 48 hours. We use a simulation area of
4, 500 × 3, 400 m , at speeds of 0.5 − 1.5 km/h for
pedestrians and 2.7 − 13.9 km/h for vehicles. We use
100 pedestrians nodes and 50 vehicular nodes. For each
of these scenarios, data traffic is generated as Poisson
process at the rate of one message per ten minutes. Each
node has a buffer size of 50 MB and the message size
is in the range of 50kB - 5MB. For each experiment,
the simulation runs for 10 times with random seeds and
the average of the metrics measured are presented.
The performance of the proposed scheme is compared
with RBTM [9], CWS [13] and Spray & Wait (S&W)
[47]. RBTM uses Bayesian filtering to probabilistically
estimate trust value and incorporates confidence factor,
deviation value and closeness centrality value to filter
dishonest recommendations. The CWS uses a reputation
model which classifies nodes based on their forwarding
behaviour and includes a neighbour’s evaluation module
for indirect trust computation. An efficient and energy
preserving scheme (S&W) is also used for comparison.
S&W sprays a number of copies into the network unlike
flooding protocols like Epidemic. However, it must wait
till one of these nodes meets the intended recipients.
These schemes are compared using the following met-
rics:
a) Delivery Ratio: The delivery ratio is the per-
centage of messages delivered to the total number of
messages created.
b) Latency: Latency is computed as the average
period of time that a message needs to travel from the
source node to the destination node.
c) Overhead Ratio: The overhead ratio measures
the delivery cost which is the ratio of the messages
relayed to the number of messages successfully delivered
to the destination.
d) Dropped Messages: This is total number of
messages discarded by nodes due to the expiration of
TTL, malicious behaviour or buffer overflow.
e) Detection Accuracy: The percentage of mali-
cious nodes that can be detected correctly.
A. Impact of message dropping misbehaviour on various
mobility patterns in the PDM
This subsection compares the impact of the proposed
schemes to the other schemes discussed. We address
packet dropping attack based on the percentage of mis-
behaving nodes. We consider 0 − 50% of the nodes in
the emergency communication network are malicious.
In Fig. 4 (a) delivery ratio, (b) overhead ratio and (c)
latency, we explore the performance of DTMS under
different traffic patterns in the PDM model. In an emer-
gency response network, the performance varies based
on movement patterns. We evaluate the impact of ma-
licious responders on these traffic patterns: Rescuers-to-
Rescuers (R-R), messages relayed by responders among
themselves for the disaster recovery operation, Rescuers-
to-Centre (R-C) messages sent by rescuers to centres,
Patrol (Police Patrol) and Centre-to-Centre (C-C) which
is movement between centres. As observed in Fig. 4(a),
the delivery ratio decreases as the number of compro-
mised nodes increase. Due to regular patrols, the patrol
team have more inter-contact times which reflect on the
delivery ratio. The R-C and R-R mobility patterns have
lower delivery ratios due to sparse and less meeting
times even though they still return to relief centre DTMS
reduces the impact of malicious nodes in the network
even when 50% of the nodes are malicious. In Fig. 4
(b) and (c), the overhead ratio and latency also decrease
as the number of malicious nodes increase because only
trusted responder nodes take part in message forwarding
hence the path cost and delay are reduced.
B. Comparison of message dropping misbehaviour with
different approaches
1) Delivery Ratio: In Fig. 5(a), the delivery ratio
of DTMS, Spray & Wait, CWS and RBTM decreases
as the percentage of malicious nodes increase. This is
as a result of the number of messages dropped by the
malicious nodes. The delivery ratio of Spray & Wait and
RBTM decrease rapidly more than DTMS and CWS.
Spray & Wait has no mechanism to detect misbehaving
nodes while RBTM computes direct and indirect trust
using Beta distribution and confidence factor which is
proposed for MANETs. As the percentage of malicious
nodes increase in the network, RBTM degrades faster
than CWS and DTMS. Compared with CWS, DTMS
has a higher delivery ratio even with 50% of mali-
cious nodes. In DTMS, the recommendation trust detects
more malicious nodes and using the recommendation
credibility which aggregates indirect recommendations.
The recommendation familiarity enhances the encounter
probability to the destination node by choosing nodes
with similar event features. In RBTM and CWS, only
the forwarding evidence are used to detect malicious
nodes. Other features such as energy consumption rate
and event familiarity features are not considered. DTMS
takes these features into consideration and works better
in mitigating malicious behaviour.
2) Overhead Ratio: In Fig. 5(b). the results show that
RBTM and CWS have a higher over head ratio than
DTMS. The clustering procedure applied in RBTMS
aggregates recommendations but also leads to a higher
routing cost because of the time spent on the computation
of the confidence value, deviation value and closeness
centrality value. Both CWS and RBTM schemes do not
address trust update explicitly. As noticed, the over-
head ratio drops as the percentage of malicious nodes
increases. This is because the messages are dropped
when relayed to the malicious nodes. The overhead ratio
computes only the number of messages that reach the
destination node. Similar results are observed in [10].
3) Latency: In Fig. 5(c), the latency which is the
message delivery delay is compared. The main cause of
latency in DTNs is retransmission and message queuing.
In mobility-aware scenarios, there is a higher inter-
contact probability when compared to random waypoint
movement model. As expected, the message delay de-
creases in all approaches. As the number of malicious
nodes increase in the network, it takes a longer time
to deliver messages to the destination nodes. However,
messages with long delays are more likely to de dropped
and these dropped messages are not considered when
computing the message delay. DTMS performs better
than CWS and RBTM when considering the message
latency. The results indicate that DTMS reduces the
message delay which reflects how quickly it detects
routing misbehaviour as the percentage of malicious
nodes increase.
4) Detection Accuracy under Collusive Packet Drop-
ping: In this section, the detection accuracy of DTMS
is evaluated when nodes collude to drop messages. Ma-
licious nodes collude to drop packets by forming small
groups. For clarity, we consider 2 groups of malicious
nodes. The first group consists of 20 colluding nodes,
represented by 10×2 i.e. two groups of malicious nodes
with 10 colluding nodes in each group. The second
group has 30 attackers, represented by 10 × 3 for three
groups of colluding nodes. A dropping probability of
0.5− 1 is considered. The detection accuracy of DTMS
is compared with CWS and RBTM, Spray & Wait is
not considered in this evaluation as it does not support
malicious node detection. In Fig. 6 (a), (b) and (c),
the detection accuracy of DTMS, CWS and RBTM
are presented. Compared to RBTM and CWS, DTMS
performs better in detecting colluding nodes. DTMS
achieves more than 70% accuracy in both colluding
scenarios considered. However, the more the number
of nodes that collude to drop packets, the lower the
detection accuracy.
C. Updating trust value
The percentage of malicious nodes affects the quanti-
fied trust value hence the trust value must be dynamically
updated. Frequently updating the trust value of nodes
will lead to rapid consumption of energy. Again, if the
Fig. 4: Performance of DTMS under different mobility patterns in the PDM (Patrol, Rescuer-to-Centre, Centre-to-
Centre and Rescuer-to-Rescuer)
Fig. 5: Performance comparison with other approaches
Fig. 6: Detection accuracy of DTMS, CWS and RBTM under varying attack settings
Fig. 7: Trust update with different time slots
interval for updating the trust value is too long, the
current behaviour of the evaluated node is not reflected
efficiently. In Fig. 7, we analyse the impact 30% of
misbehaving nodes at 30, 60 and 90 mins. It can be
observed that after 120 mins, the time slots for 60
and 120 mins are almost the same. Therefore, a longer
time slot can be used to reduce energy consumption in
this case. However, when the percentage of malicious
nodes vary, the time slot for each trust update should be
reduced especially in mobility-aware or mission critical
scenarios.
V. CONCLUSION
In DTNs, trust models have become important in
mitigating routing behaviour from compromised nodes.
The most common routing misbehaviour in DTN is mes-
sage dropping which degrades the network performance.
Therefore, an adequate and efficient detection mecha-
nism is required to mitigate this routing misbehaviour.
In this paper, a decentralised trust management scheme
has been designed and validated for mobility-aware
DTNs. The proposed scheme combines the forwarding
behaviour of nodes and their energy consumption rate
to compute direct trust. Second-hand information from
neighbouring nodes are also incorporated into the trust
model as recommendation trust. The recommendation
trust incorporates indirect trust, recommendation cred-
ibility and familiarity which is an event based trust.
Extensive simulation results show that DTMS effectively
mitigates routing misbehaviour such as packet dropping
attacks and colluding attacks. In our future work, we
will exploit solutions such as using DTN gateways to
reduce energy consumption during the computation of
direct and recommendation trust.
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